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Hallucinatory experiences are by far not limited to patients with clinical psychosis. A num-
ber of internal and external factors may bring about such experiences in healthy individuals,
whereby the personality trait of (positive) schizotypy is a major mediator of individual dif-
ferences. Psychotic experiences are defined as associating abnormal meaning to real but
objectively irrelevant perceptions. Especially, the ambiguity of a stimulus correlates pos-
itively with the likelihood of abnormal interpretation, and intelligence is believed to have
an important influence and act as protective against clinical psychosis in highly schizo-
typic individuals. In this study, we presented 131 healthy participants with 216 15-letter
strings containing either a word, a non-word, or only random letters and asked them to
report, whether or not they believed to have seen a word. The aim was to replicate find-
ings that participants with high values in positive schizotypy on the trait-level make more
false-positive errors and assess the role of stimulus-ambiguity and verbal intelligence. Addi-
tionally, we wanted to examine whether the same effect could be shown for indices of
state schizotypy. Our results support findings that both state and trait positive schizotypy
explain significant variance in “seeing things that are not there” and that the properties of
individual stimuli have additional strong effects on the false-positive hit rates. Finally, we
found that verbal intelligence and positive schizotypy interact with stimulus-ambiguity in
the production of false-positive perceptions.
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INTRODUCTION
Hallucinatory experiences, especially of an auditory nature, are
sometimes erroneously believed to exist only as symptoms of psy-
chosis and, by extension, schizophrenia. A number of studies have
shown, however, that such phenomena are not exclusive to clin-
ically psychotic patients, but can be found even in the healthy
population; e.g., (1), reports a prevalence of hallucinations of any
kind within a large tri-national sample (n= 13,057) of 38.7%,
whereof no relation to specific pathology was found in more
than half of the sample. Visual hallucinations were of consider-
ably higher prevalence than auditory hallucinations (3.2 vs. 0.6%)
in the entire sample.
Although a number of clinical and non-clinical factors exist that
bring on individual hallucinatory experiences in non-psychotic
patients [e.g., stress, caffeine, and the interaction of both; (2)], it
has been repeatedly shown that the occurrence of such experi-
ences is mediated by personality traits related to schizotypy [e.g.,
Ref. (3–5)].
On the phenomenological level, hallucinations have been
shown not to actually be seeing or hearing, etc., “things that are
not there,” but rather – as proposed by Kurt Schneider – inter-
preting abnormal meaning(fulness) to truly existent but objec-
tively meaningless stimuli [cited from Ref. (6)]. This definition
translates well into the current biological model of psychosis
and psychosis-proneness by Howes and Kapur (7), who plausi-
bly argue that abnormal meaning comes from top-down cognitive
explanations of aberrant salience attributed (as a function of a
dysregulation of dopaminergic neurotransmission) to, essentially,
irrelevant stimuli. The authors also clearly argue that individual
differences in dopaminergic (dys)regulation in the healthy popula-
tion also exist. Thus, these differences explain both the appearance
of hallucinations in non-psychotic individuals, as well as a pos-
sible biological basis of the aforementioned personality trait of
schizotypy/psychosis-proneness.
Within the schizotypy-framework as defined by Claridge (8),
high levels in schizotypy are not necessarily pathological but
potentially beneficial; a concept Claridge refers to as “benign
schizotypy.” Especially, when paired with above-average intelli-
gence, which appears to protect high schizotypes against clinical
psychosis (9), especially positive schizotypy is associated with
creativity (10, 11) and can be found in higher levels in, e.g.,
artists, novelists, composers, philosophers, etc. [q.v., (9)]. In those
cases, where eminent achievers exhibited biographical indices of
clinical psychosis, it has to be noted that their major contri-
butions usually preceded their first psychotic episode (12), or
that their psychotic conditions had not caused serious disability
or, alternatively, interrupted or ended their creative work (13).
Thus, it seems that schizotypy (especially positive schizotypy)
but not clinical psychosis is linked to benignly being able to
see patterns where others see random noise. In the case of sig-
nals within noise, highly schizotypic persons have been shown to
rely on less information in order to reach conclusions, whereby
this jumping-to-conclusions-bias does not relate to the quality of
conclusions (14–16).
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A typical paradigm for the examination of hallucinatory expe-
riences in healthy individuals is the “White Christmas”-paradigm,
during which participants are primed with the eponymous Bing
Crosby song and then listen to white noise, during which they are
asked to press a button every time they believe to hear the song
through the white noise. This paradigm has been used repeat-
edly by others [e.g., Ref. (3, 4, 17)] and has repeatedly shown the
number of false-positive hits correlates positively with schizotypic
traits. This paradigm is limited, however, as it allows for no modifi-
cation of the signal-to-noise-ratio (i.e., difficulty), which has been
shown to also be important for the occurrence of hallucinatory
experiences (18).
Galdos et al. (19) also found a significant increase in the
reporting of meaningful speech when, actually, random noise was
presented in schizophrenia patients compared to controls. Within
the control group, a similar effect was found as a function of pos-
itive but not negative schizotypy as well as of familial risk for
schizophrenia. Relevant, in this context, are findings by Dubal and
Viaud-Delmon (20) wherein self-reported auditory sensitivity was
also positively associated with magical ideation.
Regarding other sensory modalities, Fyfe et al. (21) showed
that persons high in schizotypic traits were more likely to inter-
pret meaningfulness in the random movement of triangles, and
Simmonds-Moore (22) found effects of schizotypic traits to be
more pronounced in visual than auditory stimuli. Interestingly,
however, in this publication, no main effect of schizotypy was dis-
covered regarding the number of false-positive guesses in both
modalities, but high schizotypes showed significantly greater con-
fidence in their false-positive guesses. Similar results have been
published by Corlett et al. (23) regarding the confidence in but
not the number of false-positive memories. Contrary to these
findings, however, Wilson and French (24) found that individ-
uals significantly more often reporting false-positive memories,
also had higher scores in schizotypic measures. Also of relevance
is the often reported effect that highly schizotypic persons were
more likely to display a tendency to say “yes” to ambiguous stimuli
in forced-choice paradigms [e.g., Ref. (23, 25, 26)].
The group around Tsakanikos and Reed [e.g., Ref. (18, 27–30)],
under the plausible assumption that the link between schizotypy
and a false-positive detection bias was not limited to individ-
ual sensory modalities (27), thus, created a visual word-detection
paradigm. Herein, participants were presented different moving
words and non-words and asked to note (a) whether they had seen
a “real” word and (b) which word they had seen. Through varia-
tions of the paradigm, the instructions or the difficulty of the task,
they were able to link positive schizotypy [measured through the
Unusual Experiences-scale of the O-LIFE (31)] to the tendency to
significantly more often see (and also be able to write down) words
when in fact non-words were presented. Furthermore, this link was
significantly influenced through task-difficulty and instruction-
induced expectancy; i.e., schizotypy had the highest influence
in instances (a) where a higher rate of true-positive words was
expected than was actually presented, (b) where the true-positive
rate was actually high, and/or (c) when the task-difficulty was
medium. These results suggest that too easy tasks have too high a
signal-to-noise-ratio to make “jumping-to-conclusion” necessary
and too difficult tasks lack a minimum of actual perceptual input
to allow for the emergence of a false-positive detection bias as a
function of schizotypy. A significant effect of stimulus-ambiguity
was also reported by van Elk (26).
There are, however, some factors that were not examined so far:
as briefly mentioned above, the role of intelligence (especially ver-
bal intelligence or vocabulary) can be considered a relevant factor
that may potentially moderate or mediate the effect of schizotypy
on a false-positive detection bias in a word-detection task.
Furthermore, schizotypic features, although believed to be rel-
atively stable (8), actually show a certain degree of intraindivid-
ual variation; although influenced by habitual (trait) schizotypy,
the situational (state) proneness for psychotic-like experiences
is dependent upon other internal and external factors. In other
words, the probability of having a psychotic-like or hallucinatory
experience may vary within the same individual; e.g., in response to
environmental factors like perceived (social) stress [e.g., Ref. (32)
or influences of recreational drugs (33)]. Therefore, the influences
of state measures of schizotypy may prove better predictors of
a false-positive detection bias than scores in trait questionnaires.
Moreover, it can be expected that a combination of both aspects
(trait and state), comparable to a diathesis – stress model, would
explain the highest amount of variance in false-positive detection.
It was our aim in this paper to incorporate the aforemen-
tioned variables into a single experiment and to pose the following
research-questions:
1. Can we replicate the findings of Tsakanikos; Reed and col-
leagues (q.v., above) that unusual experiences (UnEx) as an
indicator of positive schizotypy is associated with a false-
positive detection bias?
2. Is the false-positive detection bias additionally related to state
indices of positive schizotypy and what is the role of perceived
stress in this context?
3. What are the influences of signal-to-noise ratio, task-difficulty,
and verbal intelligence/vocabulary on the false-positive detec-
tion bias?
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SAMPLE
The sample consisted of a total of 131 healthy participants
(according to telephone and on-site self-report). Hereof, 27 were
male and 104 female (aged between 17 and 73; M = 27.43;
MD= 24; SD= 10.63). Participants were gathered through uni-
versity adverts, personal communications, and newspaper adverts
looking for individuals with telepathic or other extrasensory per-
ceptive experiences. Participants were fully briefed during a tele-
phone interview as well as immediately before the experiment; on
both occasions, all participants stated not currently suffering or
ever in the past having suffered from a psychological or relevant
medical condition.
Research was approved by the ethics committee of the German
Psychological Association (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie,
DGPs).
SELF-REPORT MEASURES
Trait schizotypy was assessed using the German version of the
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences [O-LIFE;
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(34)]; the Unusual Experiences (UnEx) scale was used as a mea-
sure of positive schizotypy. The O-LIFE consists of 104 items in
a yes/no-format. In order to use UnEx as a factor for a multifac-
torial ANOVA, participants were trichotomized according to the
33rd-percentiles.
State schizotypic or psychosis-like indices were assessed using
a translation of the items used by Barrantes-Vidal et al. (32) for
experience sampling methodology. These items are based on the
Wisconsin Schizotypy Scales (WSS) and, thus, have a slightly dif-
ferent factor-structure than the O-LIFE [q.v., (35)]. We therefore
combined items from the “psychotic-like index” with the “para-
noid index” to assess state positive schizotypy. Items suited only
for use in experience sampling methodology were omitted (e.g.,
“Since the last beep, I consumed: Food | Caffeine | Medication
| Snuff | Alcohol | Cannabis or other drugs”). Additionally, the
item “At the moment I am feeling stressed” was added. All state
items were coded on a visual analog scale from 0 (not at all)
to 100 (completely) and measured immediately before and after
the word-detection paradigm. Verbal intelligence/vocabulary was
measured using the Mehrfachwahl–Wortschatz–Intelligenz test
[MWT-B; (36)]. The MWT-B consists of several sets of five-letter-
combinations, whereof one is an actual word. The participant
is tasked with identifying the word; the IQ can be extrapolated
from the manual depending on the number of true identifica-
tions and the individual words that were (not) identified cor-
rectly. The MWT-B was specifically chosen, as it measures (verbal)
intelligence in a fashion similar to the trials in our paradigm.
All self-report measures were programed as online-versions
using the platform suscisurvey.de.
WORD-DETECTION PARADIGM
The paradigm was programed using Matlab (version 4.0.7 with
Psychtoolbox 3.0.9). The paradigm consisted of 216 trials, each
preceded by a fixation cross randomly shown between 1 and 2 s.
Stimuli consisted of a 15-letter sequence presented in Arial (font
size 24; white letters on black background) at a distance of 50 cm
between the participant and the computer monitor. Testing was
performed on two computers with identical monitors with equal
settings; room illumination was kept at a constant level using win-
dow blackouts, and participants were alone in the room during
the paradigm.
Stimuli were presented for 750 ms each, followed by the ques-
tion “Did you see a word?” (with yes/no-format). If the participant
answered “yes,” a second question “Please type in the word you
have seen” appeared. Thereafter, the participants were instructed
to return to their upright-seated position and press the space-bar
for the next trial to commence. Initially, four instruction trials
were presented, the first containing a true word and the second
not containing a true word (presented for 5 s), the third and
fourth instruction trials again with a true word and no word,
but presented for 2 s. These stimuli were not used during the main
paradigm.
Since the words were German, they are not presented within
the scope of this English manuscript. Interested researchers are,
however, encouraged to contact the corresponding author.
Of the 216 experimental trials, 72 contained a true word
(of five-letter length), 72 a non-word designed according to the
corresponding true word using the non-word generator Wuggy
(37) and the final 72 stimuli containing neither a true word nor a
non-word. The true words were gathered from a list of 98 German
five-letter words that fit certain criteria (i.e., they were singular-
case common nouns that contained no umlaut). These 98 words
were randomly embedded into 10 other nonsense letters and given
to a sample of 242 unrelated students during a lecture at the
University of Applied Science, Giessen, by the principal author.
The student were asked to rate the word from “easy to detect”
to “difficult to detect” (5-point Likert scale) without time limit.
From this, average difficulties were calculated and the 12 “easi-
est” as well as the 12 “most difficult” words were chosen for the
paradigm at hand. For each of these 24 words, a corresponding
non-word was created. Words and non-words were each pre-
sented three times, namely once at the beginning, the middle, and
the end of the 15-letter stimulus (e.g., HEARTZBKMLPTWFG,
ZBKMLHEARTPTWFG, and ZBKMLPTWFGHEART; English
word and bold print used just here for clarity). Presentation-order
was randomized for each participant, but each participant was
presented all 216 stimuli.
Responses were coded by hand (and double-checked by an
independent persons) into either of four categories; namely, true-
positive, true-negative, false-positive, and false-negative. With
respect to the aim of these particular study questions, the cate-
gories other than false-positive as well as the reactions times shall
not be used as dependent variables within this publication.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
All statistical analyses were performed using SPSS (version 15).
Due to reported effects of age and sex on UnEx [q.v., Ref. (31,
34)] respective variance was removed for between-subject analyses
using the generalized linear model by saving standardized resid-
uals and assigning these to the dependent variables. A similar
approach was used for the false-positive hit rate in case of sig-
nificant effects of factors not related to our research question (e.g.,
age, intelligence).
For within-subject analyses (i.e., influences of word difficulty
and -position as well as signal-to-noide ratio), a dependent-
samples GLM-analysis was performed with raw false-positive hits
as dependent variables in a 2× 3-design (two steps for difficulty;
three steps for position). A second dependent-samples GLM-
analysis was also performed for the analysis of effects of the
signal-to-noise ratio on the false-positive hits. This was opera-
tionalized through the trial-condition (word, non-word, random
letters); with increasingly fewer semantically interpretable entities
(word> non-word> random letters) the signal-to-noise ratio was
expected to decline.
For between-subject analyses (i.e., influences of schizotypy), an
independent-sample GLM-analysis was performed with the stan-
dardized residuals of the false-positive hits (independently of dif-
ficulty or position) as dependent variables and the trichotomized
UnEx-group as factor.
For the analyses of the effects of state schizotypic indices and
stress, linear regressions were performed with the standardized
residuals of the false-positive hits (again, independently of dif-
ficulty and position) as dependent variables and the positive
schizotypy index and the stress-item as regressors.
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 135 | 3
Grant et al. False-positive perception and schizotypy
In case of replication questions (i.e., the effects of trait or state
positive schizotypy on the false-positive detection rate), one-tailed
testing was called for Ref. (38); for all other analyses, two-tailed
testing was performed.
Data were controlled for outliers, whereby for the effects of pos-
itive schizotypy on the false-positive detection rate one case was
eliminated; for all other analyses, it was not necessary to remove
this case.
RESULTS
Over the total of 216 trials, our 131 participants reported an aver-
age of 5.45 (SD= 4.93) false-positive hits. The range was from
0 (four participants) to 37 (one participant), whereby the latter
was considered as the aforementioned outlier, as the next high-
est number of false-positive hits was 26, followed by 19, and then
continuously from 16 through 0. The median was four and there
were two modes (1 and 3, with 18 participants each); the second
highest number of false-positive hits was four (14 participants).
This appears to be substantially higher than in comparable studies
by Tsakanikos and colleagues [e.g., Ref. (18)].
The first question was, whether state and trait positive schizo-
typy had significant influences on the false-positive detection rate.
For these analyses, the age- and sex-corrected UnEx-scores were
used as dependent variables (in the ANOVA, the sample was
trichotomized as described above). Dependent variable was the
false-positive detection rate, corrected (as described above) for
confounding factors (i.e., intelligence, age, etc.).
We found a significant effect of UnEx (positive schizotypy) on
the false-positive detection rate [F2, 127= 3.01; p= 0.027 (one-
tailed)], whereby Bonferroni-corrected post hoc test showed that
this effect was mainly explained by the highest scores in the
high schizotypy group compared to the low schizotypy group
[p= 0.032 (one-tailed)].
The regression of state positive schizotypy was also signif-
icant [β= 0.254; corrected R2= 0.057; F1,128= 8.85; p= 0.002
(one-tailed)]. Perceived stress had no significant predictive power
regarding the false-positive hits; the interaction with state pos-
itive schizotypy, however, was significant (β= 0.231; corrected
R2= 0.046; F1,128= 4.72; p= 0.008).
The effects of word-position and word difficulty were analyzed
using a within-subjects model with Greenhouse-Geisser correc-
tion on the false-positive hits (uncorrected for between-subject
confounders). Both main effects as well as their interaction were
significant; i.e., word-position (F1.8, 243.46= 9.16; p< 0.001; par-
tial η2= 0.066), word difficulty (F1,130= 20.01; p< 0.001; partial
η2= 0.133), and interaction (F1.87,243.49= 6.49; p= 0.002; partial
η2= 0.048). Descriptive statistics showed higher false-positive hits
with difficult compared to easy words. Regarding word-position,
with easy words the rate of false-positive hits was lower when
the word was presented at the beginning of the 15-letter string
compared to the middle or end. In the hard word category,
false-positives were identical when the word was presented at the
beginning or end, but higher when the word was presented in the
middle. Over all, the highest and lowest false-positive hits were
difficult words presented in the middle and easy words presented
at the beginning, respectively.
Both main effects as well as the interaction were no longer sig-
nificant when IQ was introduced into the model as a covariate;
thus, suggesting that verbal intelligence moderates the effects of
word-position and -difficulty. It has to be mentioned that an inter-
action between the within- and between-subject factors in one
model could not be analyzed, since the within-subject design did
not allow for correction of between-subject confounders, whereby
the between-subject design necessitated a correction for between-
subject confounders. Using between-subject factors as covariates
and, apparently, “correcting” for these factors, is, in fact, not a
probate method in this case (39).
When positive schizotypy was entered as a covariate, the main
effect of difficulty and the interaction between position and
difficulty remained significant, albeit with reduced effects sizes
(difficulty: F1, 129= 5.65; p= 0.019; partial η2= 0.042; interac-
tion: F1.88, 241.87= 4.27; p= 0.017; partial η2= 0.032). Addition-
ally, although the main effect of position was no longer significant,
there was a significant interaction between position and posi-
tive schizotypy (F1.82, 234.75= 3.327;p= 0.042; partialη2= 0.025).
This effect was the only one that remained significant (with the
same effect size), when both IQ and UnEx were simultaneously
entered as covariates.
In case of the effect of the signal-to-noise-ratio (operational-
ized through “condition”: word, non-word, random letters) the
main effect was significant (F1.68, 217.84= 102.81; p< 0.001; par-
tial η2= 0.442), showing similar false-positive hits in the con-
ditions with the highest and lowest signal-to-noise ratio (word
and random letters) but an increased detection bias in the non-
word condition. The effect remained significant but of reduced
size when UnEx, IQ, and both were entered as covariates into
the model (respectively: F1.69, 218.1= 22.67; p< 0.001; partial
η2= 0.149, F1.68, 216.63= 4.34; p= 0.019; partial η2= 0.033 and
F1.7, 217.07= 3.86; p= 0.029; partial η2= 0.029). There were no
significant interactions between condition and either positive
schizotypy or IQ.
DISCUSSION
We found a significant effect of positive schizotypy on the false-
positive detection rate, whereby especially highly schizotypic par-
ticipants had more incidences of “seeing words that were not there”
than low schizotypic individuals. This result is in complete agree-
ment with the findings reported by Tsakanikos and Reed (27, 28).
Due to the complexity of the other additionally analyzed factors
in this study, we chose not to examine the effects of other schizo-
typy facets or other performance indices (i.e., true-positives and
-negatives as well as false-negatives and reaction time) within the
scope of this paper for reasons of brevity.
Additionally, we found that not only trait but also state schizo-
typy, as assessed through the items used in ESM-studies by
Barrantes-Vidal et al. (32), significantly predicted the false-positive
hits and interacts with self-reported stress. The latter, in and
of itself, did not have predictive power regarding the detection
bias in our paradigm. Thus, it would seem that the effects of
stress moderate the influence of state schizotypy. This is in line
with the supposition that stress (or stressful life events) not only
act as facilitators of inter individual differences in schizotypy or
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psychotic-like experiences [e.g., Ref. (40)] and intraindividual dif-
ferences [e.g., Ref. 32)] but also that highly schizotypic persons are
more susceptible to stress (41).
In within-subject designs, we found significant effects of the
difficulty of the presented word and the position thereof as well
as the interaction of both of these factors. Presenting words that
had been rated as difficult to detect leads to higher false-positive
errors than easy words. Furthermore, when words were presented
in the middle of the 15-letter string, more false-positive errors
were made, independently of word difficulty, than when words
were presented at either the beginning or the end of the stimulus.
In the interaction, easy words presented at the end of the string
lead to the lowest and difficult words presented in the middle of
the string to the highest rates of false-positive errors.
Regarding the signal-to-noise ratio, which was operationalized
through the task condition (i.e., the relation of semantically inter-
pretable unit to “letter jumble”), we found that the condition with
middle signal-to-noise ratio (i.e., non-words) elicited higher false-
positive hits than the high or low signal-to-noise ratios (i.e., word
and random letters).
These results agree with the proposition by, i.a., Tsakanikos (18)
that very easy tasks (e.g., high signal-to-noise ratio, easy words,
words that began or ended the 15-letter string) usually require less
cognitive “filling in the gaps” and, thus, incur less errors. In the
highly difficult conditions, persons would make less false-positive
errors as they would have more difficulty to identify potentially
semantically relevant units and, thus, be more likely to answer
that they had not seen a word. In this case, a follow-up question
would be, whether these difficult conditions elicited significantly
more false-negative errors. The finding most necessary to discuss,
in our opinion, is that in case of the difficult words presented
in the middle the high false-positive hits mean that participants
made double-errors; i.e., an additional false-negative error, as they
had, actually, not identified the presented word correctly. Extrapo-
lated to clinical psychosis, this would be comparable to a situation
where a patient, e.g., sees an unknown (but truly existent) face
but erroneously interprets this as another person’s face or even
something else (e.g., the face of a demon). This would explain
anecdotal evidence that hallucinations occur more often at night
or in the early evening or morning [(42); q.v., patients’ state-
ments on schizophrenia.com]. Also in healthy individuals it is
obviously more common to “see something” at night or during
dusk and dawn.
The influence of IQ in this case is highly relevant and, to our
knowledge, examined for the first time in research of this kind in
healthy individuals. The introduction of verbal IQ as a covariate
into the model completely eliminated the main effects of diffi-
culty and position as well as their interaction and considerably
reduced the effect size of condition. This can be interpreted along
the same line of argumentation as before. The higher the intel-
ligence, the more it is likely that difficulty and position will no
longer influence the false- as well as the true-positive detection
rates (especially considering that we specifically chose an intelli-
gence test with the MWT-B that extrapolates IQ from a number
of tasks inherently similar to our paradigm). In other words, the
capability of identifying a word independently of its position or
difficulty will increase with the aptitude for this kind of task (as
measured through the MWT-B). Therefore, the main effects and
the interaction will be most prominent in participants with (rela-
tively) low verbal IQ and, thus, were to be expected to no longer
be significant when IQ was entered as a covariate. Regarding the
reduction of effect size of condition by IQ, the same explanation
as above holds.
Going back to the supposition that intelligence may be pro-
tective in high schizotypes regarding their transition into clinical
psychosis (9), our findings may help explain this. We chose an IQ-
test that consisted of a task specifically measuring the aptitude to
what we were also measuring in our paradigm. If one extrapolates
to crystalline or g-factor intelligence in general, one would also
expect that this will influence stimulus-processing on a broader
range of levels. Thus, it should be expected that highly intelli-
gent individuals experience less ambiguity in perceived stimuli
and thus require less top-down cognitive “filling in” of gaps and
are, therefore, less prone to (especially bizzare) psychotic experi-
ences. Future studies will be necessary, in order to ascertain the
verisimilitude of this supposition.
The effects of schizotypy are also of particular relevance, espe-
cially within the scope of this paper. In order to explore this further,
we performed individual one-tailed ex post facto t-tests between
the high and low schizotypy groups for each variety of word dif-
ficulty, word-position, and task condition in order to assess where
the effect of schizotypy was strongest.
These analyses showed that differences were most pronounced
in the non-word condition (T 82= 2.55; p= 0.006) with a trend
in the word condition (T 82= 1.5; p= 0.068) and no difference
in the random letters condition. Similarly, schizotypy did not
explain significant differences when difficult words were presented,
but there was a trend in the cases of presentation of easy words
(T 72.74= 1.53; p= 0.065). With regards to position, words pre-
sented in the middle lead to the greatest schizotypy-dependent
differences in false-positive hits (T 82= 1.98; p= 0.025), especially
if these words were easy words (T 64.76= 2.31; p= 0.012). Inter-
estingly, however, although there were not schizotypy-dependent
differences in the false-positive hits when difficult words were pre-
sented or when words were presented at the beginning of the
15-letter strings, there was a trend in case these factors were com-
bined; i.e., high schizotypes had tendentially higher false-positive
hits in cases were difficult words were presented at the begin-
ning of the stimulus (T 82= 1.46; p= 0.074). All effects were in
the expected direction; i.e., highly schizotypic persons always had
higher false-positive hits rates than low schizotypic persons.
These results, on the one hand, show that in the non-word
condition, where most false-positive errors were made, these can
be explained significantly by individual differences in trait posi-
tive schizotypy; this is, again, in agreement with Tsakanikos (18)
that schizotypy-dependent differences are most pronounced in
middle signal-to-noise ratios. The same goes for the differences
explained by schizotypy regarding the false-positive reactions to
word presented in the middle of a 15-letter string. Furthermore,
although difficult words lead to a higher false-positive hit rate
in general, highly schizotypic persons showed significantly, and
borderline-significantly more errors in easy words compared to
low schizotypic persons. It can, thus, be asserted that the effects of
schizotypy (although significant) are less pronounced than those
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of the stimuli. This is in line with the repeated findings that (a) any
person, independently of schizotypy, can experience psychotic-like
experiences when presented with the “right conditions” and (b)
that highly schizotypic persons will be more likely to experiences
psychotic-like experiences not only in general but especially in sit-
uations were low schizotypic persons will not have a psychotic-like
experience.
To summarize, we replicated findings that positive schizotypy
leads to a “jumping-to-conclusions” bias and that this bias is most
heavily pronounced in reaction to relatively highly ambiguous
stimuli. Furthermore, we could show that the effects of schizotypy
are considerably less strong than those of stimulus-quality and,
thus, that schizotypy explains most variance in those conditions
that are not of themselves ambiguous enough to lead to errors in
judgment in most persons. In other words, ambiguity increases
the amount of errors, but highly schizotypic persons require less
ambiguity as a facilitator of a false-positive detection bias than low
schizotypic individuals.
We extended upon previous findings by showing that (verbal)
IQ significantly moderates both a general detection bias as well
as the interactions between said bias and trait schizotypy. Fur-
thermore, we showed that not only trait but also state schizotypy
significantly predicted false-positive errors. Although both factors
correlated significantly in our study [q.v., (32)], an interaction with
stress shows that situational psychosis-like experiences in healthy
individuals are not solely a factor of habitual schizotypy.
In conclusion, our results further the understanding that hal-
lucinatory experiences in non-clinical individuals are not only a
factor of healthy variations in schizotypy but also depend more
heavily on the quality of stimulus-perception and cognition as well
as (task-specific) cognitive abilities – as shown by the considerable
effects explained through verbal IQ.
Over all, we believe that our study presents a significant add-on
to other related findings. We replicate previous results and add
relevant information regarding, especially, state schizotypy and
intelligence. In the future, different variations of paradigms of this
sort may be used and, additionally, combined with imaging and
psychophysiological methods (e.g., fMRI and EEG). We are also
currently in the process of examining the effects of genetic factors
in this relation. It could be expected that specific polymorphisms
as well as additive effects of different polymorphisms that are rel-
evant to schizotypy may yield further insight. Preliminary results
are highly promising, but we chose not to publish these as yet,
due to the fact that the number of participants willing to provide
a DNA-sample so far is not large enough to reach the statistical
power needed for genetic association studies.
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